3 “Babies aren’t persons”: a survey of delayed personhood

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Introduction

To better understand attachment from a cross-cultural and historical perspective, I have amassed over 200 cases from the ethnographic and archeological records that reveal cultural models (D’Andrade and Strauss, 1992) of infancy. The 200 cases represent all areas of the world, historical epochs from the Mesolithic to the present, and all types of subsistence patterns (Appendix 3.1). The approach is inductive where cases with similar models of infancy are clustered into archetypes, demonstrating that most societies view infants and even children as not-yet-persons. Infants are born into a state of liminality or incompleteness. Among the Wari, a baby is compared to unripe fruit as it is “still being made” (Conklin and Morgan, 1996, p. 672), and the Nankani reserve judgment on the infant’s humanity until they can be certain it is not a spirit or bush child (Denham, Adongo, Freyberg et al., 2010, p. 608). In this chapter, I will identify first the main factors that give rise to delaying personhood and, second, the cultural models that justify and guide the transformation of babies into persons.

Attachment and attachment parenting

In the middle of the last century, John Bowlby (1953), a British psychotherapist, advanced a set of ideas about the emotional ties between a mother and her infant and the deleterious effects of maternal deprivation. These propositions are now widely known as “attachment theory.” A critical component of the theory was its universality; all
mother–child dyads must engage in behaviors that build and strengthen mutual bonds during a critical period from 6 to 18 months. The theory has, since then, gathered adherents across a broad spectrum, from developmental psychologists testing for evidence of “secure” versus “avoidant” or “ambivalent/resistant” attachment (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters et al., 1978) to social workers who point to attachment failure as the root of criminal behavior. Numerous empirical studies have extended attachment to nonindustrialized societies with mixed results, but, overall, they suggest considerable cross-cultural variability (Keller, 2007; Tomlinson, Murray, and Cooper, 2010; van IJzendoorn and Sagi-Schwartz, 2008).

There has, nevertheless, been a steady escalation in the expectation for adequate parenting to prevent attachment failure (Karen, 1998; Newton and Schore, 2008). Recently, attachment theory can be regarded as having morphed into a kind of secular religion where mothers worship at the altar of “attachment parenting.”¹ That is, among the social elite in the USA, “attachment” has become synonymous with good, correct child rearing. This “movement” is supported by many quasi-scientific parenting volumes as well as by web-based organizations. The goal of “Attachment.org” is to provide help for “each wounded child with attachment disorder,” which is caused by, for example, “caring for baby on a timed schedule or other self-centered parenting.”² Much of the advice-to-parents literature suggests that full-scale attachment parenting is supported by anthropological research (especially on topics like the frequency of nursing and physical contact between mother and infant) and is, therefore “natural.” Failure to embrace the whole suite of prescribed parenting practices is, therefore, unnatural. One confirmed apostate in the new attachment parenting faith is noted US media personality Erica Jong. She characterizes attachment parenting as follows: “You wear your baby, sleep with her and attune yourself totally to her needs [but how can you] do this and also earn the money to keep her.”³

Another, more credible, dissenting perspective is provided by a study of attachment in Germany. In spite of the fact that, by standardized measures, “two-thirds of the Bielefeld children were classified as “insecurely attached,” the authors reject the possibility that these children are at risk of developing personality disorders (LeVine and Norman, 2001, p. 97). And they suggest that the behavior of German mothers is guided by

¹ www.attachmentparenting.org/ ² www.attachment.org/
³ Ibid. Another variation in the intensive mothering movement is the “naturalist” approach, which has also attracted the attention of social critics (Badinter, 2012).
a cultural model of child development that cautions against excessive attention being paid to the infant:

They view the infant’s needs for physical and social care as important but emphasize attention to satisfying those needs without disturbing family routines too much, and they are also concerned about the danger that a young child will become “spoiled,” verwöhnt, by excessive attention and too much accommodation to its needs and demands. (LeVine and Norman, 2001, pp. 91–2)

Attachment and anthropology

Anthropologists studying mother–infant relations provide ethnographic descriptions that do not square with “attachment parenting” orthodoxy. Researchers who have directly addressed attachment theory have expressed considerable skepticism of the theory based on the evidence from their own ethnographic research; Gottlieb’s study of the Beng (1995), Scheper-Hughes’ (1987) study of Alto do Cruzeiro, and LeVine’s (2004) work with the Gusii are notable. For example, consider the Kpelle in rural Liberia, where babies experience “casual nurturance by mothers who carry their babies on their backs and nurse them frequently but do so without really paying much direct attention to them; they continue working or . . . socializing” (Erchak, 1992, p. 50). Paradise records, “When a [Mazahua] mother holds a nursing baby in her arms she frequently has a distracted air and pays almost no attention to the baby” (1996, p. 382). “Gusii mothers rarely looked at or spoke to their infants and toddlers, even when they were holding and breast-feeding them” (LeVine, 2004, p. 154). In none of these cases did the anthropologists observe any decrement in the mental health of individuals subjected to – in attachment-parenting orthodoxy – maternal deprivation.

These studies represent robust illustrations of what LeVine has called the “anthropologist’s veto” (2007, p. 250). That is, anthropologists have a history of undermining the claims of universality made by developmental psychologists. Two further examples include the practice of talking to nonverbal infants in a special speech register (baby talk or motherese). Usually assumed to be both universal and essential to the development of speech in children, it is neither (Ochs and Schieffelin, 1984). “Parenting style” theory (Baumrind, 1971) cannot withstand cross-cultural scrutiny. Central African Bofi farmers fit the so-called authoritarian parenting style in valuing respect and obedience and exercising coercive control over their children. Bofi children should, according to theory, be withdrawn, nonempathetic, aggressive, and lacking in initiative. On the contrary, they display precisely the opposite traits, leading Fouts to conclude that the theory “has very little explanatory power among the Bofi”
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(2005, p. 361). More recently, Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan (2010) have crafted a sophisticated literature review illustrating the ethnocentric bias and distortion that is found in leading research paradigms. Because of biased population samples and the inherent ethnocentrism of investigators, the views on child development found in WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) society are taken as the norm and, hence, nurture is turned into nature (Lancy, 2010). A historical perspective on the same phenomenon argues that “the attachment model of early child development belongs to the ideological camp of child-centered freedom and equality against old-fashioned parentally imposed order and discipline” (LeVine and Norman, 2001, p. 100).

The basic argument underlying attachment theory is that each individual’s mental health is at risk during the first two years of life. The child’s psyche can be damaged if it is unable to establish a firm emotional tie to its mother (or appropriate substitute). The mother, in this theory, is expected to behave in ways that ensure attachment (Bowlby, 1953). In contemporary application of the theory (e.g., “attachment parenting”), the mother is challenged to take care of the infant’s needs in a supportive and emotionally warm manner, leading to a strong emotional bond. Among maternal behaviors commonly assumed to play a critical role in this process are the following: being available at all times to tend the infant; breast-feeding; holding the infant en face; speaking to it in baby talk or motherese; cuddling, kissing, and otherwise demonstrating the strong positive affect the mother feels towards the infant and; playing with it. A mother’s failure to actively promote her infant’s emotional “high” leads to attachment failure, which leads to prison or worse.

From my survey of the literature on infancy outside contemporary bourgeois society, I can assert that the anthropological cases just mentioned are not atypical. The ethnographic record is quite consistent in showing mothers frequently nursing infants but, otherwise, paying them relatively little attention (Ainsworth, 1967; Lancy, 2007; Reichel-Dolmatoff, 1976). Indeed, LeVine (2004) and others (True, Pisani, and Oumar, 2001) are probably correct in arguing that any baby that is – minimally – given regular and predictable nourishment while in close contact with another human being will be protected from the orphan warehouse syndrome or what Spitz (1945) called “hospitalism” and any lasting emotional damage. But I want to do more than pile on further cases that cast the theory of attachment – or at least the extreme position represented by the attachment-parenting movement – into doubt. My goal here is to inductively construct a cultural model (D’Andrade and Strauss, 1992)
or models of infancy that help us to understand why the contemporary preoccupation with attachment has more to do with fashion than child welfare. The survey suggests not only a very “light” version of attachment parenting but also that, in most societies, the greatest challenge facing families with newborns is to avoid forming a premature attachment. The infant’s needs are obvious; less obvious are the needs of its mother and family and of the wider circumstances attendant on its birth. I identify the factors that may be present and that constitute the ecology of infancy. These factors all signal the need for caregivers to maintain a degree of emotional distance from the child. Six factors emerged from the survey that militate against or temper the attention paid to infants. These are as follows: high infant mortality rate and chronic illness; the mother’s vulnerability; alloparenting and fostering; dysfunctional families; neglect because the infant is unwanted or on probation; abandonment and infanticide; and a utilitarian view of offspring. I take up each in turn.

Factors influencing cultural models of infancy

High infant mortality and chronic illness

Infant-mortality data are available for a range of societies from prehistoric settlements, nomadic foragers, and farmers to complex societies in Europe and Asia. These data suggest that from one-fifth to one-half of babies did not survive until the age of 5 years (Dentan, 1978; Kramer and Greaves, 2007; Lancy, 2008; Le Mort, 2008). We can extrapolate from these figures to conclude that miscarriages and stillbirths were also common by comparison to current levels. Likewise, we can expect that if half the children died, then somewhat more than half were seriously ill in childhood. Indeed, in many contemporary villages studied by anthropologists, the level of clinical malnutrition is 100 percent, as is the level of chronic parasite infestation and diarrhea. There are, then, ample reasons for withholding investment in the infant and maintaining a degree of emotional distance.

It was a Roman writer, Epictetus, who noted, “when you kiss your child, say to yourself, it may be dead in the morning.” (Stearns, 2010, p. 168)

Childhood, according to the seventeenth-century French cleric Pierre de Bérulle, “is the most vile and abject state of human nature, after that of death.” (cited in Heywood, 2001, p. 9)

The infant mortality rate [among the Bajau] is extremely high, and it is not uncommon to encounter a family with more deceased than living children. In
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fact, infant mortality is so high that some parents cannot even recall the number of their deceased children. (Nimmo, 1970, p. 261)

In the 1760’s Lomonosov estimated that fully one-half of Russia’s children died by the age of three. (Dunn, 1974, p. 385)

Of 15,000 babies left at the Ospidale Innocenti between 1755 and 1773, two-thirds died before reaching their first birthday. (Kertzer, 1993, p. 299)

The Neolithic era skeletal sample consists of 109 infants less than one year old, twenty-five juveniles, and 106 adults . . . [T]he age distribution of juveniles . . . reveals a high proportion of infants less than one year old, most of them (ninety-one per cent) deceased perinatally (Le Mort, 2008, p. 25).

The relatively low reproductive rates of hunter-gatherer populations have been attributed to high natural mortality, low fertility, and cultural practices such as infanticide and sexual abstention. (Spielmann, 1989, p. 321)

These grim statistics provoke a “wait-and-see” attitude towards the newborn, and the narratives or parental ethnotheories (Harkness and Super, 1995) constructed about infancy reflect this uncertainty.

The mother’s vulnerability

Another inexorable factor affecting the newborn is the threat it represents to its mother. Throughout much of human history, pregnancy has been treated as a serious illness. Childbirth was, until recently, extremely risky and even if the mother survived she might become the target of jealousy and witchcraft on the part of human and nonhuman adversaries. She and the babe are both contaminated by the process of birth and the spilling of puerperal blood. Women are also made vulnerable by the need to observe food taboos at critical junctures such as menstruation and pregnancy. These taboos often involve restricting their intake of high-quality fat and protein-rich foods (Spielmann, 1989). Most critical is the fact that the new mother is also likely to be responsible for maintaining a household; caring for a husband, older children, parents, or parents-in-law; and making a major contribution to subsistence or the domestic economy through (for example) craftwork (Boserup, 1970). The health and recovery of the mother are seen as far more urgent than the emotional health of the infant.

Childbirth is by far the greatest peril faced by [Semai] women in their reproductive years, accounting for thirteen of twenty-nine deaths (forty-five per cent), and half of all deaths from known causes. (Dentan, 1978, p. 111)

“A pregnant woman has one foot in the grave” according to a proverb from Gascony. (Heywood, 2001, p. 58)
Pregnant [Masai] women attempt to become as emaciated as possible in order that the birth may proceed more easily. During the last 3 or 4 months of pregnancy the woman abandons her normal diet and exists on a near starvation diet . . . The last month, she drinks only milk. (DeVries, 1987, p. 170)

A budda may “eat” the blood of the [Macha-Galla] child or the mother, causing illness or even death. A tolca may harm them by some malevolent action. (Batels, 1969, p. 408)

The [new Ladakh] mother is plied with foods [to] regain her strength. Her health is paramount – to care for the baby and to get back to the routine household and agricultural tasks upon which the success of the household depends – while household members simply hope for the best with regard to the newborn. (Wiley, 2004, p. 132)

Behavioral scan data also provide evidence for male dominance: women spent twenty-one per cent more time working than men . . . and men spent twenty-nine per cent more time resting than women. (Strassmann, 1997, p. 688)

Given the threats to its survival and low value relative to the mother (and older, living siblings), it is not surprising that the infant is, at least initially, in a marginal state.

**Alloparenting and fostering**

At the peak of her childbearing years, the young mother is also a critical contributor to the household economy. Hence, most societies embrace alloparenting as the means to lighten the mother’s burden and thereby increase her fertility and her productivity. In a comprehensive survey of the ethnographic record, “forty per cent of infants were rated as being cared for by others . . . or cared for more than half the time by others. After infancy . . . less than twenty per cent of the societies had mothers as principal caretakers” (Weisner and Gallimore, 1977, p. 170). Numerous studies underscore that infants are tended as often by a grandmother or older sibling as by the mother (Hrdy, 1999). Furthermore, the widespread prevalence of wet-nursing (Sussman, 1982), adoption and fostering (Alexandre-Bidon and Lett, 1999), and, less commonly, the sale of infants (MacGinnis, 2011) suggests that the bond between mother and child should be, preferentially, weak.

Despite the fact that Aka [forager] and Ngandu [farmer] mothers carry their infants with them during subsistence activities, the frequency of maternal caregiving and maternal intimacy is negatively associated with work activities . . . When high-quality allomaternal care is available, Aka mothers reduce caregiving and spend more time in subsistence-economic activities. (Meehan, 2009, p. 389)

While awake, Hausa infants are almost always in close physical proximity to one or more adult caregivers . . . infant signals, such as crying, are responded to promptly
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by adults or older children . . . Although Hausa infants appear to be attached to three or four different figures (including fathers), most are primarily attached to one. Importantly, the principal figure is not necessarily the mother, who is solely responsible for feeding, but rather the person who holds and otherwise interacts with the infant the most. (Tomlinson et al., 2010, p. 185)

[Beng mothers have several strategies] to bind the infant to potential caretakers. When a visitor calls, the baby is to be awakened and displayed proudly . . . “You want to teach your baby how to be sociable, too, and to get to know all her relatives . . . make sure the baby looks beautiful! Every morning after you give the baby her bath, make sure you put herbal makeup on her face . . . the baby will be so irresistibly beautiful that someone will feel compelled to carry her around for a while that day.” (Gottlieb, 1995, pp. 23–4)

There are numerous taboos and rules of avoidance between [Baotombu] biological parents and children [who have been given in adoption]. They are forbidden to call the children by their first name. Instead, they have to use nicknames or paraphrases. Even in the first hours after birth I observed mothers expressing distance towards their newborn child in the presence of a watching crowd of friends and relatives. (Alber, 2004, p. 40)

To the extent that attachment theory focuses attention on the mother’s behavior, we can see that her responsibilities as caregiver may be attenuated by cultural patterns that elevate other aspects of her multifaceted role and that cast others in the role of caregiver. If the child has not already been under the care of others, certainly at weaning it will be. “Toddler rejection” (Weisner and Gallimore, 1977, p. 176) is a widely reported phenomenon in which the infant is weaned early (by its lights), separated from its (likely pregnant) mother, placed in the care of a grandmother or sib-caregivers, and, generally, ignored (Lancy and Grove, 2010).

Dysfunctional families

The flip side of the alloparenting, “It takes a village” childcare pattern is that, in some societies, strife within the extended family is endemic – leading to chronically dysfunctional families. By dysfunctional, I mean that strife between the generations, between spouses, and between cowives is so common it is expected. Indeed, conflict is so much a part of daily life that it is reflected in the cultural model of infancy. The Dogon

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4 I must stress that this level of conflict within families is by no means universal or even widespread. On the contrary, I have to agree with Hrdy's (2006) characterization of humans as cooperative breeders, a corollary of which is that immediate and extended family members, including cowives, do contribute in positive ways to the child's survival. A key factor differentiating among these cases is the closeness of kin ties. In situations of chronic family conflict, the household consists of a mixture of people who are not all closely related. The women are living patrilocally, with little contact with their natal families, and the child may be exposed to the questionable care of stepfamily members.
case has been most thoroughly studied and reflects the rivalry that may exist among unrelated cowives. Other examples of the child being the center of rivalry among women from West Africa follow.

The indigenous Dogon explanation is that poor survivorship under polygyny reflects competition among cowives. Cowives are not related, and the rivalry among them extends to their sons, who, upon the death of their father, almost invariably stop farming together. It was widely assumed that cowives often fatally poisoned each other’s children. I witnessed special masked dance rituals intended by husbands to deter this behavior. Cowife aggression is documented in Malian court cases with confessions and convictions for poisoning. These cases raise the possibility that Dogon sorcery might have a measurable demographic impact – a view that is consistent with the extraordinarily high mortality of males compared with females. Males are said to be the preferred targets because daughters marry out of the patrilineage whereas sons remain to compete for land. Even if women do not poison each other’s children, widespread hostility of the mother’s cowife must be a source of stress. (Strassmann, 1997, p. 693)

Sorcery is considered to be the most important reason for a child’s death. It is seen as a serious problem. Because of envy, hatred, vindictiveness, or simply bad intentions some people decide to use sorcery to hurt a rival or someone they dislike. A child is often the chosen victim. (Einarsdottir, 2004, pp. 116–17)

[Hausa] babies can be stolen by witches or child-seeking spirits. To avoid the attention of these entities, it is best not to openly praise children. “Rolling your child in cow dung is also a good way to fool greedy spirits into thinking that your child is not worth taking.” Occasionally, remark to a friend, “Have you ever seen such an ugly baby?” (Johnson, 2000, p. 187)

The source of conflict may be the adulterous liaisons of a parent. “Divorce and remarriage . . . increase a child’s risk of dying” (Sear and Mace, 2008, p. 9), and children exposed to interparental conflict show heightened levels of cortisol and long-term negative health outcomes (Flinn and England, 2002).

[Phiringaniso is an illness attributed to violation of the norms of sexual behavior by a [Tsonga] parent of the sick child. It is usually provoked by a man’s having extramarital intercourse while his child is still breastfeeding . . . The child becomes “contaminated” and soon after exhibits watery diarrhea. The mother might also cause this diarrhea in her child by having “outside” sexual relations. (Green, Jurg, and Djedje, 1994, p. 11)

A woman in San Gabriel sometimes said that her second child had died of colerin, caused by drinking her breast milk when she was consumed by jealousy, rage, and

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5 Anecdotally, cowives are described as assisting each other with domestic duties, including childcare. However, the only studies to attempt to document a positive effect on child outcomes in a polygynous household found such effects only for high-ranking wives with negative outcomes for the children of low-ranking wives (Isaac and Feinberg, 1982).
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pain from learning that her husband was having an affair. Colerin is incurable; it strikes and kills vulnerable infants quickly and surely. Children are thus killed by their fathers’ selfish, irresponsible actions, which poison their mothers’ milk. (Morgan, 1998, p. 70)

The conflict could arise from the jealousy of an older sibling who has been (or is about to be) displaced from the breast or the mother’s full attention.

If [an Ijaw] woman with a living child has experienced one or more unsuccessful pregnancies, or if she has not apparently conceived for a long period after having a child, a diviner might tell her that the living child wishes to be the last child, that it wants no younger rivals, and that it is killing her unborn babies. (Leis, 1982, p. 163)

In at least some societies, conflict within the family is endemic or to be expected. Under these circumstances, the threats to the child’s survival are magnified, casting in the shadow any concerns over attachment and the child’s long-term emotional health. On the contrary, conspicuous displays of affection or emotional bonding could attract the attention of harmful forces or individuals.

*Infant unwanted or on probation, leading to neglect, abandonment, and infanticide*

Only a tiny fraction of the world’s societies has accorded an unconditional welcome to every new member (Meskell, 1994). In societies where well-formed, full-term newborns may not survive to become helpful and able to pay back the investment made in them, the actuarial odds dictate a very careful evaluation of the newborn. Is it completely whole? Does it behave normally, crying neither too little nor too much? Is it a girl when a boy is infinitely preferred? Did it arrive “too soon” before its older and, hence more valuable, sibling had been weaned? Is it unquestionably the offspring of its mother’s husband (Schiefenhovel, 1989)? Does the mother have a husband?

Illegitimate [Mundurucu] children are usually killed at birth, along with twins and children with birth defects. If the child does survive it is referred to as “tun” which means excrement. They are not abused, but they cannot marry due to their indefinite status. (Murphy and Murphy, 1985, p. 127)

It was an ironclad rule that no [Tapirapé] woman should have more than three living children . . . A fourth child, or a third child if it were of the wrong sex, was buried immediately after its birth . . . “We do not want to see hunger in their
eyes.” They pointed out to me the difficulty of providing food, especially meat, for more than three children. (Wagley, 1977, p. 135)

Children delivered in breech births were sometimes exposed. In a Han-dynasty lexicon, the word for breech is equated with (wu), meaning “obstinate”, disobedient, or unfilial. Thus it is possible that the child’s ability to physically torment its mother on its first day of life may have been interpreted as foreshadowing its future unfilial behavior. (Kinney, 1995, p. 25)

The Bakairi selectively practice infanticide . . . Most of such cases occur when the mother is still nursing an older infant and cannot properly care for another baby. (Picchi, 2000, p. 64)

You take them out into the bush and you leave them . . . they turn into snakes and slither away . . . You go back the next day, and they aren’t there. Then you know for a sure that they weren’t really [Dogon] children at all, but evil spirits. (Dettwyler, 1994, pp. 85–6)

Among the Songye, those defined as “bad” or “faulty” children, including albino, dwarf, and hydrocephalic children, are considered supernaturals who have been in contact with sorcerers in the anti-world; they are not believed to be human beings, and they are expected to die. (Devleger, 1995, p. 96)

Previous surveys of ethnographic and historical records affirm that the elimination of infants by abortion (Devereux, 1955) and infanticide (Daly and Wilson, 1984) is nearly a cultural universal. Dickeman claims that “This capacity for selective removal in response to qualities both of offspring and of ecological and social environments may well be a significant part of the biobehavioral definition of Homo sapiens” (Dickeman, 1975, p. 108) Again, the reasons for “not becoming too attached” predominate.

Utilitarian view of offspring

The society that spawned and embraces attachment parenting is, comparatively, wealthy and well educated and enjoys both low infant and maternal mortality and a low birthrate. As documented in the Value of Children (VOC) surveys, there has been an ongoing transition – driven by economic development – from valuing children for their economic contributions to valuing them for the psychological rewards they bestow (Ka˘gitci˘ba¸si and Ataca, 2005; see also Zelizer, 1985). Theoretically, each newborn is or was subjected to a cost/benefit calculation (Trivers, 1972). The costs are considered to be high, even for wanted, healthy offspring while the benefits lie in the future. In many societies, it is not until middle childhood that the individual can make a significant contribution to the household economy and is “noticed” (Lancy and Grove, 2011a).
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Individual infants are devalued if they are unlikely to provide a future return on the investment that will, perforce, be made in them.

In [the Beng] language, one word for “child” really means “little slave”. “As soon as the little one can walk confidently, don’t hesitate to send your child on errands in your village or neighborhood.” (Gottlieb, 2000, p. 87)

A[n Amish] baby is never spoken of as “a little stranger” but is welcomed as a “new woodchopper” or a “little dishwasher.” (Hostetler and Huntington, 1971, p. 22)

In the Chinese language, “good” children are literally contrasted with “useless” or “unusable” children. (Wee, 1992, pp. 192–3)

In Salic law [of the sixth-century CE] . . . one who killed a free young woman of childbearing age had to pay 600 sous . . . [i]t is astonishing how small a case is made for the newborn, since the one who killed a male baby only had to pay sixty sous (thirty sous if it was a girl). (Alexandre-Bidon and Lett, 1999, p. 13)

I have earlier contrasted our culture as a neontocracy, in which infants are treated as cherubs, with the premodern world, which exhibits characteristics of a gerontocracy where children are viewed as chattel (Lancy, 2008). This contrast allows us to see that the culture that gave birth to “attachment parenting” is rather unique in human annals. Most humans would ask why we should be excessively concerned about the feelings of an individual of such low value/status?

Delayed personhood and cultural models of infancy

Although I have argued that there are at least six overarching issues militating against attachment, these constitute only the raw material from which cultural models can be constructed. These raw facts serve as the foundation for culturally constituted theories of child development. The single most common element in non-Western cultural models of infancy is delayed recognition of the infant’s personhood or humanity. By treating infants as existing in a liminal state and not being fully human, the community erects a large shelter or cognitive comfort zone within which several problems can be worked out. First of all, infants really are different. Contemporary bourgeois society, almost uniquely, has chosen to construe those differences in a positive way (Lancy, 2008). Gurgling and babbling are evidence of cuteness, not limited mental capacity. Because we enjoy the luxury of diapers, fresh water from a faucet, soap, and lotions, our babies smell sweet, not poopy. Our mothers can take pleasure in playing peek-a-boo with their baby rather than having to lug it like a heavy bookbag for miles to and from the fields. If one is not inclined to view the baby as an adorable cherub, then many infant characteristics,
such as its lack of speech, softness, lack of motor control, crying and screaming, constant runny nose, diarrhea, lack of teeth and hair, and lack of mobility, might be seen as anomalous, bestial, or frightening. The Lepcha (among others) think of the infant as still being in the womb (Gorer, 1938) and not yet fully born. Indeed, most societies subscribe to some version of the idea that the infant is not just a really pathetic human being – it is not a human being. Nor is it clear at the outset that it will necessarily become human, perhaps it is just a messenger or a vehicle being used by supernaturals.

A decision had to be made within four days after parturition, for by that time an [Inuit] infant had to be named. And, once named, the disposal of a child would be an act of murder because a named infant was regarded as a social person. (Balikci, 1970, p. 148)

During this period no one is very certain whether the [Ashanti] infant is going to turn out a human child or prove, by dying before this period has elapsed, that it was never anything more than some wandering ghost. (Rattray, 1927, p. 187)

Two [Fulani] folk illnesses regarded as supernaturally caused, foondu and heendu, were important final diagnoses of the cause of death [which, when applied] to a dead child's last illness shifts accountability for the death to the community as a whole, rather than leaving the individual mother personally responsible. (Castle, 1994, p. 330)

The dead child is thought to have been the soul of someone to whom the [Hong Kong] parents owed a debt. When the debt is paid in terms of care invested in the child, it dies. (Martin, 2001, p. 162)

Delayed personhood can serve as a firm foundation for building cultural models of infancy that are responsive to the six issues noted earlier. For example, infanticide is excused on the basis that one is not disposing of a person. Chronic illness and failure to thrive can be explained away as the failure of body and spirit to fuse, with the spirit drawn back to the other world (Teixeira, 2007). Infants still have one foot in the spirit world, rendering them vulnerable to supernatural forces.

The “not yet ripe” model

The delay in conferring personhood or outright denial serves as explicit or implicit foundation for several overarching cultural models of infancy. These models share one characteristic: most societies place the infant in a dynamic between two poles, expressed by concepts like hard versus soft. The infant's movement between these poles is closely monitored and carefully orchestrated.
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We start with the “not yet ripe” model. The denial of personhood is based on the patent deficiencies of the infant as a social being. Various attributes are singled out, including, for example, the infant’s softness and lack of motor control. Significantly, these models are used to explain the basis of nonpersonhood but also include prescriptions for turning the baby into a person (Bonnet, 2007) – they have “directive force” (Harkness, Super, and Keefer, 1992). For example, the extremely widespread use of swaddling or cradleboard to restrain the infant is seen as compensating for and minimizing the long-term effects of the infant’s softness and lack of motor control.

[Navajo] babies are kept . . . in the cradle to make them straight and strong. Some women let their children lie on sheepskins and roll about, but they are always weak, sick children. (Leighton and Kluckhohn, 1948, p. 23)

As a why infants are swaddled, [Nurzay] women explained that the newborn baby’s flesh is *oma* (lit. unripe) like uncooked meat, and that only by swaddling will it become strong (*chakahosi*) and solid like cooked (*pokh*) meat. (Casimir, 2010, p. 16)

Food taboos are aimed at “hardening” the [baby’s] body . . . The goal is to make the baby vigorous and strong, so it can grow fast and develop into an independent member of the longhouse. [Huaorani] men I interviewed insisted that both parents were . . . assisting in its fast growth through [their] fasting. (Rival, 1998, p. 623)

New-born [Amele] infants (*momodo*) are cold and soft . . . and must be strengthened by the application of warm hands heated over a fire. Only liquids, preferably lukewarm, may be given to *momodo*. As strength develops and the infant can hold up its head, it is known as *momo memen*, literally “infant becomes stone”. (Jenkins, Orr-Ewing, and Heywood, 1985, p. 39)

[Among the Bororo . . . the naming process takes place only when it is detected that the baby is “hardened” enough (usually some five–six months after birth). It is only through the naming ceremony that the child becomes “socially born” and recognized. (Fabian, 1992, p. 66)

Other areas singled out as needing ripening to transform the infant into a human being are speech (Bird-David, 2005; Kleijjuegq, 2009), self-locomotion (Bugos and McCarthy, 1984; Remorini, 2011), acquisition of social knowledge and skill (Montague, 1985; Musharbash, 2011), and intelligence (Geertz, 1961; Riesman, 1992; Woolf, 1997).

But not until the *kulio* (from *kungh* + *li*, lit: head shaving), on the eighth day after birth, does the [Mandinka] infant move into the status of a fully recognized member of the family. (Whittemore, 1989, p. 87)

A [Ovimbundu] baby is born pink and it is only when he turns dark at the sixth or eighth day that he shows the first indication of becoming a person (*omunu*).
He shows further promise in that direction with his first show of sense, but all through childhood he is, in a sense, only a potential person. (Childs, 1949, pp. 120–1)

Before children can be treated . . . as individual persons or “selves”, they have to become Ambonwari . . . the main concern of initiation is to bring a “non-being” into Ambonwari being . . . Until boys are initiated at six or seven, they are “not Ambonwari”. (Telban, 1997, p. 316)

For a [Gusii] mother to engage a small child, let alone an infant, “in conversation” would . . . seem eccentric behavior . . . since . . . a child is not a valid human being until he reaches the age of “sense”. . . six or seven years old. (LeVine and LeVine, 1981, pp. 43–4)

There seem to be progressive phases of recognition of the [Bariba] child as a permanent member of society, key among which is the appearance of teeth. Both mothers and fathers state that they await the appearance of teeth anxiously to determine the future of the child and, in fact, to identify the child’s essence – human or witch substance. (Sargent, 1988, p. 82)

Interestingly, there is relatively little consensus in the “not-yet-ripe” model or the remaining two to be discussed (“unconnected” and “two worlds”) regarding the age at which personhood is achieved. In fact, of 200 cases in which there is an evident delay in granting personhood, only in forty-three has the investigator indicated a likely stage or transition point after which personhood is acknowledged. Of these, in roughly fifteen cases, the point falls within the first year with a second cluster (sixteen) at ages 5–9 – the age of “sense.”

The “unconnected” model

A second, but obviously parallel, model highlights the view that an infant, because it is kept in seclusion or largely hidden in the voluminous layers of its mother’s clothing (Tronick, Thomas, and Daltabuit, 1994), is still in a womb-like state (Cerulli, 1959). To become fully human, the infant must exit from this metaphorical womb and enjoy a second birth where it is joined to its father, his clan, and the extended family (Blanchy, 2007). To achieve this requires survival and maturation on the part of the newborn, but, as well, various rites of separation and attachment are mandated. Soninké rites of separation involve proper treatment of the umbilical cord and placenta, while attachment rites include a ceremony with singing by a griot (storyteller and praise singer), the exchange of gifts, and acknowledgment of the child by ritual leaders (Razy, 2007).
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For the first three days of life the [Lepcha] baby is considered to be still in the womb and all the pre-natal precautions have to be observed. It is not even referred to as a human child; it is called a rat-child. (Gorer, 1938, p. 289)

The new-born [Vlach] child sleeps tightly swaddled in a wooden rocking cradle which is enveloped from end to end in a blanket, so that he lies in a kind of dark airless tent. (Campbell, 1964, p. 154)

The post-partum [Japanese] child remains, inseparably, a part of its mother. The infant continues to develop within the protective, womb-like environment of its mother's presence, excluding others. (Lebra, 1994, p. 261)

In a sense, a [Tamang] baby enters the world without a clan since it can only become part of the partrline after three days; to underscore this, male members of the household usually remain away from the child. (Fricke, 1994, p. 133)

Many ... post-natal practices involve the gradual shedding of the symbols for maternal ties, e.g. for a [Hubeer] child that has not yet passed through the first ceremonies (e.g. the banaan bixin) that declare his agnatic links, it can be said that "his bones are not yet hard". (Helander, 1988, p. 150)

This set of cases suggests that social attachment, including attachment to collectives like the extended family and clan, is of far more importance in cultural models of human development than psychological attachment.

The "two worlds" model

In a strictly statistical sense, the most common rationale for withholding personhood is that the infant has not yet committed itself to being human. It is suspended between two worlds, the human world and the "other" world of spirits, ghosts, ancestors, and gods. There are several variations on this part-spirit/part-human theme, including characterizations of the child that emphasize its purity and innocence (see the section "Little angels", below), other views that see the child as a conduit of evil forces (see "Little devils", below), and, lastly, the notion that the spirit child has no intention of becoming fully human (see "Tricksters," below). First, I will discuss cases where there is a distinct tension between the spirit or soul and the body.

Having just come out of the Dreaming, the soul or spirit (kurumpa) of Anangu infants is still closely linked up and in communication with the Ancestors. (Eickelkamp, 2011, p. 109)

When the [Azande] child is born the soul has not become completely and permanently attached to its abode. Hence it is feared that the soul may flit away and
this is one of the reasons for confining infant and mother to a hut for several days after birth lest “The child’s soul might get lost”. (Evans-Pritchard, 1932, p. 404)

The perceived relationship of [Mende] infants with the world of spirits generates loyalties in conflict with the world of the living . . . infants are presumed to develop unusual powers of vision and the powers to move across different sensory domains. (Fermé, 2001, p. 198)

Once people die, their souls . . . are said to become . . . spirits, that travel to wrruge, the land of the dead . . . Eventually, the ancestors are reincarnated into this life. All newborns are seen as having just emerged from wrruge [but if they die they’re seen as still residing there]. [S]ometimes their ancestral identities are revealed early in childhood. (Gottlieb, 2000, p. 59)

A newborn [Yukui] has been contaminated by [puerperal] blood and is also more likely to succumb to disease or birth defects during these first few weeks of life. The baby was therefore regarded as not yet belonging fully to the world but lay somewhere between the spirit domain and that of the living. (Stearman, 1989, p. 89)

In the following section, I will discuss the practices that are followed in order to ensure that the child’s spirit and body are permanently joined.

**How cultural models influence behavior**

**Uniting spirit and body**

The “two worlds” cultural model not only explains observed phenomena but also prescribes actions to be taken by the infant’s caregivers. Among the Nzebi in Gabon, twins are seen as spirits who choose to live among humans. It is important not to offend them so they do not engage in reprisals, such as the communication of various diseases and bad dreams, or simply return to where they came from. Ritual activity persisting to adolescence controls the malevolence and eventually, makes the child fully human (Dupuis, 2007). In the Bolivian Andes, a precise and elaborate swaddling procedure guards the infant against susto, an illness that results in the separation of body and soul (de Suremain, 2007). A caregiving style that emphasizes keeping the infant in a coma-like state – always quiet and sheltered – is also often justified on the basis of ensuring that the spirit does not flee (Broch, 1990; Howrigan, 1988; Reichel-Dolmatoff, 1976). Of course, this policy (along with using swaddling and cradleboards) also reduces the amount of attention that the mother must devote to the infant.

A [Mandok] newborn’s inner self (*anumu*) was not yet firmly anchored inside its body . . . and for this reason both new parents observed many food and
behavioral taboos after the birth... New fathers were prohibited from going fishing in channels and in deep water, nor could they hull out canoes, carve, or chop down trees... If the child cried inexplicably, the Mandok believed that one of the parents had violated a taboo that caused its anunu to leave. A ritual specialist was then called in to “call the baby back”... As the child grew, the Mandok believed that the anunu gradually moved from “the surface of the skin” to the inside of the body, a common belief in other areas of Melanesia as well. (Pomponio, 1992, p. 77)

A new-born [Punan B ah] child is considered little more than a mere body of blood, bones and flesh. Only gradually as the soul... takes up residence in the child, does it become human... The souls of children... can easily be scared away, and children must be handled with the greatest care at least till they are about four years old when they become more secure – [for example, they are] never punished physically so as not to scare off their souls. (Nicolaisen, 1988, pp. 198–9)

General or prolonged fussiness, a refusal to eat or outright sickness – all these may be diagnosed as symptomatic of the spirit’s withdrawal from the body. To secure its permanent integration with the body, the [Qiqiktamiut] family and others make every effort to encourage it to remain... and the creation of important ritual ties to members of the community outside the natal household. (Guemple, 1979, pp. 41–2)

In the earlier discussion of the ecology of child health and survival, I noted that illness and death are likely among children in many of the societies studied. Hence, even if correct preventative practices are followed, parents must confront the reality of sick children. In the next section, I show how folk medical theory and practice is also informed by “two worlds” thinking.

**Illness and cure**

A great deal of the ethnographic literature in infancy records strategies for diagnosing illness or discomfort and corresponding remedies. You will note that an underlying theory in these prescriptions is that the child’s well-being is compromised when it appears excited or agitated. Caregivers seek to remove the source of agitation – which may be spirit forces – and return the child to a “healthy,” quiescent state. If these remedies fail, the cause is sought in malevolent or supernatural forces, not the mother or the family.

[In rural Iran] Djenn are said to be after the mother's liver (jigar). They are also jealous of the baby, especially during the first ten, or better, forty, days; they might steal the baby or exchange it for their own, sickly one. A baby indicates
that it might be a changeling by fussiness, weakness, or lack of growth. (Friedl, 1997, p. 69)

If an infant gets sick frequently, parents might give the child a new name – that of a blacksmith, for instance, or others who Tibetans consider to be of low birth – as a way of tricking malevolent forces into leaving the child alone . . . This act not only grounds the infant in this world, but also ties the child to his home and lineage. (Craig, 2009, p. 155)

During its first . . . months the babe is considered highly vulnerable to danger from local spirits. Infant mortality among rural Javanese is in fact high . . . slametan [communal feasts] follow at regular intervals during childhood, each accompanying a ritual event that introduces the child to a new, more secure stage in life. (Jay, 1969, p. 99)

[In rural Japan] the Ubugoya was a place where the mother and the baby could hide themselves from ghosts and evil spirits . . . A baby was considered to be transferred into the human world by a god. A midwife . . . played a religious role in guiding the baby from the gods’ world to the human world and giving social recognition to the baby as a member of the community. (Yanagisawa, 2009, p. 88)

[Aborigine] babies . . . were vulnerable to attacks by mamu . . . evil spirits that live in the bush. When an infant was bitten, his soul would fall ill and the baby got unwell. (Tjitayi and Lewis, 2011, pp. 58–9)

The “two worlds” model underscores the child’s vulnerability; its slender hold on life. But this impermanence may be construed in a more positive light. Quite a few societies, especially in ancient times, saw opportunity in the child’s indeterminate – part spirit, part human – state. Because the child was not considered fully human, it was assumed to have extra-human capacities.

Little angels

These innocent and pure spirits could be utilized to appease or otherwise communicate with the other world of ancestors and gods (Hearn, 2007; Klaus, Centurion, and Curo, 2010). Child sacrifice is not uncommon. Infant and child remains are often recovered from “foundation deposits” at the base of important buildings (Colón with Colón, 2001; Moses, 2008; Sachs and Vu, 2005; Scott, 1999). In an example from the ethnographic record, the Bolobo believe that exchanging his or her soul with the uncontaminated soul of an infant can save a bewitched adult. As the adult gradually recovers health, the infant sickens and dies (Viccars, 1949, p. 223). Other examples from antiquity are as follows:

Children were seen to possess this particular gift and were considered to have a position intermediate between the human world and that of the gods . . . Children
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were considered suitable for the task of prophesy, functioning as intermediaries between the divine and human worlds in Greco-Roman society. (Horn and Martens, 2009, p. 179)

[A Japanese saying was] “one of the gods until the age of seven”… Before seven, children were weak, and could die easily from sickness… [They could instantly return to the world of the gods and Buddhas at any time]… possess[ed] the power to transmit the will of the [deities] and often played the role of medium between gods and people. (Kuroda, 1998, p. 10)

[Aymara] children who die before being named and gaining godparents are buried in a place far from the household and the community cemetery where they are “eaten” by the mountain spirits… because these unnamed and un-baptized children still belong to the world of the mountain deities and have not yet been socialized into the human world. Children only become truly human when they begin to walk and talk. (Sillar, 1994, p. 51)

The classical and biblical texts, as well as the archaeology, all indicate that healthy living children were sacrificed to the gods in the Tophet… The burned bones found inside jars from the Carthage Tophet provide conclusive evidence for Phoenician child sacrifice. (Stager and Greene, 2000, p. 31).

[Roman] children had long been used in religious and propitiatory ceremonies, because of the quality of purity often associated with children. (Rawson, 2003, p. 315)

The greatest number of… sacrificial offerings [in Mayan cenotes to the water god Chac] were between four and ten years of age – precisely the period of greatest potential and liminality, given current understandings of ancient Mesoamerican conceptualizations of childhood. These children… still embodied the purity and connection to the spirit world that would erode gradually until they were approximately ten. (Arden, 2011, p. 142)

These examples underscore that the child is in a liminal state – not yet fully human and not yet completely attached to the mother. These incomplete emotional bonds may enable the child’s family more easily to relinquish the child to serve ritual ends.

**Little devils**

Alternatively, the infant may be viewed as threatening, either in its own right or as a vessel or avatar for ghosts and evil spirits (Nath, 1960). In practical terms, this view may lead to caregiving behaviors that are similar to those deployed when children are seen as transient spirits with special powers. Whether children were seen as pure and innocent or as threatening, the effect on childcare practices might be the same.

Protestant and Catholic dogma influenced the inclusion of infants within cemeteries. Newborns were considered to be corrupted by the original sin of their
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conception, and unbaptized or stillborn infants were not permitted burial in consecrated ground. (Lewis, 2007, p. 33)

[Certain] births coincide with the intensely active and aggressive phase of the yearly yin/yang cycle, thereby imbuing the nature of such neonates with these dangerous traits... Han histories suggest that parents who believed these predictions typically abandoned or killed ill-omened children rather than attempting to “transform” them. (Kinney, 1995, p. 24)

They did not consider infanticide itself an immoral act. The basic reason for this was that newborns are categorized as inhuman. Consistent with the perception that birth processes are repulsive and dangerous, Korowai say that a newborn is “demonic” (laleo) rather than “human” (yanop). People explain this categorization by noting that a newborn’s skin is uncannily pale, that newborns are torpid, and that their bodies are generally freakish. (Stasch, 2009, p. 151)

When a [Pamiri] child is born and fidgets and cries [a lot] and he has a black circle around his mouth and eyes, it means that he may have jinn [genies or spirits]. To solve the problem, one has to open the child’s mouth and look at the roof of his mouth. If you observe black veins, you need to make a hole in the veins with a needle and mop up the blood with a swab. The child gets better and does not cry again. (Keshavjee, 2006, p. 75)

The belief that infants were felt to be on the verge of turning into totally evil beings is one of the reasons why they were tied up, or swaddled, so long and so tightly. (Haffter, 1986, p. 11)

Because the very young are seen as a potential conduit allowing the transmission of dangerous forces into the family or community, steps have to be taken to guard against this possibility. These steps include practices like baptism, swaddling, avoiding eye contact with the infant, or bloodletting. However, one of the greatest threats posed by the spirit child is to thwart a mother’s ardent desire for offspring. To counter this threat, truly drastic measures are required.

Tricksters

Across Nigeria, the cultural model of infancy includes the notion that the spirit intends to trick its parents by continually being reborn but then returning to its true abode. The remedies for breaking this endless cycle of rebirth are severe.

If [Ijaw] parents have experienced several infant deaths, one after another, they usually suspect that the same child is coming to them each time. (Leis, 1982, pp. 156–7)

Abiku children are “born to die”; after living with their parents for only a little while, they leave to rejoin the spirit companions who have always been tempting
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them to return. Sometimes, [the Yoruba] believe, the same abiku child will come back time and again to torment the parents with its temporary presence, only to die in due course...This belief in abiku children may be operating as a necessary and ingenious explanation for the high rate of infant deaths, providing a satisfactory framework within which such distressing episodes may be accepted. (Maclean, 1994, p. 161)

[The deceased child of an Ibo mother who has lost several in succession] is deemed unlucky, and cannot live in this world. The faster it is blotted out of existence the better...Dismembering the body before it is burned is also very common. The ashes are usually scattered to the four winds...Hanging the body from a tree and letting it rot...is another common disposal method for the child. (Basden, 1966, p. 282)

Another version of the infant as trickster is found among the Toradja of Sulawesi.

[Such] children were...put away in a hole that was made in a large, living tree...The body was placed...on end, with the head downward...after which the hole was nailed shut with a small board. This was done so that the child’s tanoana would not return to earth and call the tanoana of other children, so that the latter would also be stillborn or die soon after birth. (Adriani and Kruijt, 1950, pp. 708–9)

Our data are not limited to the accounts of ethnographers or historians. Archeological excavations and analyses of postmortem treatment of the young offer very strong support for the claim that personhood is delayed.

Postmortem treatment and delayed personhood

Several lines of evidence drawn from the way in which infants and children are treated in death strongly reinforce the delayed personhood argument (Senior, 1994) and, in turn, signal the need to resist attachment. First of all, burial rites and mourning may be minimal or actively discouraged in the case of a child younger than 5 years (Fricke, 1994; Ndege, 2007) or even as late as 10 (Rawson, 2003). The variability is consistent with the variability in marking the age at which the child is considered a person. The attention of the family and community should be on the next child, not on the one that has died. For example, “the average duration of a birth interval is substantially shorter following an infant death than when an infant survives” (Kramer and Greaves, 2007, p. 720).

It is not unusual for the [Ayoreo] newborn to remain unnamed for several weeks or months, particularly if the infant is sickly. The reason given is that should
the child die, the loss will not be so deeply felt.” (Bugos and McCarthy, 1984, p. 508)

[Bagesu] children often died at birth or in infancy, and the bodies were thrown out into the bush.” (Roscoe, 1924, p. 25)

[When a Chippewa infant died,] weeping was frowned upon for the fear that the sorrow would be passed on to the next child. (Hilger, 1951, p. 79)

When a [Tonga] child died before it was named, there was no mourning for no shades were involved . . . the old women will tell the mother to hush her wailing, saying this is only a ghost (cello). (Reynolds, 1991, p. 97)

When we turn to the archeological record, excavators find that, save for a few societies such as ancient Egypt (Meskell, 1994), and during the city-state period in Athens (Houby-Nielsen, 2000), infants and children were buried apart from older children and adults (King, 2006).

Children’s remains located outside the confines of communal burial grounds are a common finding throughout the world, and during all time periods. (Lewis, 2007, p. 31)

In Xaltocan . . . burials of infants and young children less than four years of age were recovered . . . under room floors and . . . also incorporated into house walls. (De Lucia, 2010, pp. 612–13)

[Mapuche] infants are not buried in the cemetery, but are buried in the old family plot or somewhere near the house; it is believed that it would be harder for the child to be turned into a demon if it is closer to the house. (Faron, 1964, p. 91)

In Early Mycenaean Greece, infants of less than one year of age were differentiated by their total exclusion from organized extramural cemetery areas and by the absence of complete vases in their graves . . . Children of between 1–2 and 5–6 years of age were still only included in formal extramural cemeteries in exceptional cases. (Lebegyiv, 2009, p. 27)

An analysis of Etruscan child burials in Tarquinia enables one to conclude that the absence of children below the age of five and a half years from the principal cemeteries was suggestive of a major shift at that age. (Becker, 2007, p. 292)

A review of postmortem practices, including any funerary and internment rites, complements the ethnographic record. The data underscore the child’s liminality and lack of integration into the social world of the community. At death, it is mourned privately or not at all, and it is interred discreetly, without ceremony.

Discussion

The goal of this chapter has been to use the archives of anthropology and history to interrogate or critique many of the claims made by Bowlby and
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his successors. For example, Bowlby argued that it was “essential for mental health that the infant and young child should experience a warm, intimate and continuous relationship with his mother . . . in which both find satisfaction and enjoyment” (Bowlby, 1953, p. 11). These arguments – particularly regarding the nature and effect of “maternal deprivation” – have not gone unchallenged by child-development scholars (Clarke and Clarke, 2000; Tizard and Tizard, 1974) and cultural anthropologists (LeVine, 2004). Moreover, many of Bowlby’s more extreme arguments are sustained and expanded upon in the writing of his successors (Karen, 1998; Newton and Schore, 2008) who espouse “attachment parenting.” The advocates operate from an assumption of universality – that the dictates of attachment parenting should be immune from significant cross-cultural variation.

In the survey reported here, the intent has been to go beyond merely identifying societies that do not seem congenial to attachment theory (e.g., Erchak, 1992; Paradise, 1996). With an extremely large and diverse database of cases, I have been able to find common patterns within the cross-cultural variability and construct both general and more specific models of infancy. These models can be used as lenses to examine claims made regarding the essential components of psychologically healthy infancy. “Attachment theory” and its descendants have created a narrative of infants “at risk” of emotional maladjustment. In this survey of sources from cultural anthropology, history, and archeology this perceived risk is absent. It is to be presumed that infants’ emotional needs are met simultaneously with their need for sustenance, and nothing further need be done. The survey also reveals that an alternate narrative identifies attachment rather than attachment failure as the risk. A strong, emotional bond is seen as impeding a process whereby infants are pragmatically sorted into categories of wanted versus unwanted, timely versus untimely, legitimate versus illegitimate, strong fighters versus sickly ghosts, and innocent versus demonized, leading to sustained nurturance or extinction. The risk of inopportune attachment is met by an overarching cultural model that denies the newborn personhood – often until it is several months, if not years, old. Personhood is delayed until the child’s spirit and body become firmly united, and the individual “ripens” into an independent and unique being capable of social interaction.

A very thorough survey has failed to provide either much evidence for maternal concern for the infant’s emotional security or evidence of such concern in the cultural models of the infancy and early childhood period – just the contrary. We might then ask what are the cultural and historical forces shaping attachment theory or attachment parenting in the
modern era? With the decline in infant mortality and beliefs concerning changelings and other malevolent incarnations of the infant, we should expect that restraints on attachment will be relaxed. Improved access to resources has reduced the need for infanticide and child labor. Various forces have combined, leading to lower birthrates. Contemporary parents now see their (fewer) offspring not as investments for the future but as providing emotional rewards in the present. Where much of the world can be considered a “gerontocracy” with ancestors and elders on top and children at the bottom, the society that has embraced attachment parenting is clearly a “neontocracy” with children at the apex of the value scale (Lancy, 2008, pp. 25–6). Caring for infants has become a pleasure rather than a burden. Adults’ dignity is not impaired when they play with their children. Frequent gestures and words of affection exchanged between parents and children have become the norm. However, while genuine threats to the child’s safety, health, and nutrition have declined dramatically in the last century, parental anxiety, seemingly, has not. The list of fears – sometimes quite irrational – such as fear of the child’s abduction (Tulloch, 2004), has grown quite long. These include concern for the child’s happiness, which historians trace to the early twentieth century Stearns (2010); exaggerated and misguided concern for the child’s self-esteem (Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger et al., 2005); and, quite recently, the curtailment of children’s free play as exposing the child to unacceptable risks (Lancy and Grove, 2011b), to name just a few. I suggest that the fear that a normal child growing up in an average, middle-class home is at risk of reactive attachment disorder (RAS) flows from the same thinking. Collectively, these concerns have the effect of constantly raising the bar for what is considered adequate parenting. However, there is increasing resistance to these ever-rising expectations for parents, leading to what is referred to in the mass media as the “mommy wars.” “mommy wars.” On one side are those who argue that raising a healthy and successful child requires the full-time attention of the mother, while on the other side are those who feel that children require less care and that it can be delivered by a range of caregivers (Steiner, 2007).

Given the many threats to the child’s viability as outlined in this chapter, it is not at all certain that evolution would have favored the formation of strong bonds of attachment between children and their caregivers. I believe my findings are consistent with arguments made elsewhere in this volume (e.g., chapters by Johow and Volland, Keller, and Weisner) that suggest numerous fitness benefits of weak attachment. Among these, we would include a mother’s motivation to become pregnant soon after losing or disposing of a child whose viability was uncertain. Prolonged mourning or depression would undermine fecundity. In fact,
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we should ask several questions of attachment-theory adherents. First, why would a creature who is utterly dependent on others for its care and feeding not automatically (no further evolved mechanism needed) cling to its saviors? Second, why would a sentient human that has made and continues to make a huge investment to replicate itself genetically, not automatically take steps to protect that investment (no further evolved mechanism needed)? Third, why do we need to posit a special sort of emotional bond only experienced by the very young when we expect and take for granted the emotional bonds that form whenever human beings live in proximity and behave prosocially towards one another? The challenge is actually to resist forming an emotional bond given the inherent risks, and delaying personhood is the rationale that most societies offer to the infant’s close kin to help them respond to that challenge. Hence, I would argue that much of attachment theory in both original and attachment parenting versions reflects not universal, species-wide adaptations but, rather, adaptations to a very recent and culture-specific model of infancy. And, unlike the widely accepted “delayed personhood,” view, in this contemporary model, personhood now begins with conception, if not before.

Appendix 3.1 Geographic distribution of sample

Europe

North Africa
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East Africa

Central Africa

West Africa

Southern Africa

North America
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Highland South America


Lowland South America


Mesoamerica


Melanesia

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**Polynesia/Micronesia**

**East Asia**

**West Asia**

**Central Asia**

**Southeast Asia**
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